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The 2008 Financial Recession
and Fair Value Accounting
Anthony Hurlburt
ABSTRACT. The recent U.S. housing bubble was correlated with lax underwriting standards,
flawed housing polices, and Wall Street innovation. At the peak of the housing bubble, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board issued standard 157, which provided guidance on
fair value accounting. Once the housing market deflated, the standard led many to believe
that it was the sole reason asset values collapsed, creating a liquidity crunch and prolonging
the financial recession. This paper investigates the causes of the housing bubble and
Financial Accounting Standard’s relevance in the aftermath. It finds that fair value
accounting simply exposed the poor underwriting standards, bad public policy, and Wall
Street’s gross underestimation of risk.

I. Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis unraveled the world economy as both private and
public miscues led to the most severe economic downturn since the Great
Depression. The precise cause of the crisis been debated in the media and
among scholars without reaching a consensus. Wall Street financial
innovations paired with U.S housing legislation reduced mortgage
underwriting standards nationwide making credit accessible for low-tomiddle income households. Households were unable to repay their debt
and defaulted – leading to write-offs for both public and private lenders.
Rarely mentioned are accounting standards’ effects on financial markets
during the years 2007-2009. These standards are drafted by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board to ensure accountability and disclosure under
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). One standard,
Financial Accounting Standard 157, refers to mark-to-market accounting
and requires firms to measure assets and liabilities at market value. During
the financial crisis, markets were extremely volatile, or in some cases,
nonexistent -- resulting in firms recording assets at depressed values. Was
the implementation of Financial Standard 157 the sole reason US capital
markets deteriorated during the financial recession of 2008? Interpretation
and awareness of financial reporting regulations will give insight in to how
financial markets reacted during this period. Understanding the effect they
had on U.S. financial markets may help us improve them.
77
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A. DEFINITION/CONCEPTS
Securitization was an important component of the financial crisis.
Securitization is the process of turning illiquid assets (e.g loans,
mortgages) into investment instruments such as common stock, bonds, or
mortgaged backed securities. For instance, Bank XYZ approves a
mortgage, adding an asset to its balance sheet. To issue more mortgages,
XYZ will sell this mortgage to a larger company, ABC, Inc. ABC, Inc. will
subsequently set up a special purpose entity with the sole purpose of
collecting payments on the mortgage. The special purpose entity issues
stock or bonds, called mortgaged back securities. The securities allow
investors to earn a return on the underlying mortgage. Through
securitization, simple transactions had the ability to create a credit bubble
by allowing banks to approve mortgages with little regard to performance,
as long as investors in special purpose entities prospered.
Collateralized debt obligations were another financial innovation
correlated with the housing bubble. A collateralized debt obligation is like
a mortgage backed security, except, it pools various assets such as account
receivables, automobile loans, and student loans into tranches of varying
risk. The asset pool would be broken down in terms of crediting rating
such as AAA, AAA-, BBB, BB, etc. As the assets in a tranch became
riskier its credit rating would decrease, but potentially more profitable.
The collection of principal and cash flows (interest payments) is the same
as a mortgaged backed security, but disbursements from the special
purpose entity are based on the hierarchy of credit ratings. Thus, as the
underlying assets became worthless, the tranches rated the worst saw the
most significant losses. If an investment firm or commercial bank failed
to sell the complete offering of a collateralized debt obligation, it would
package the remaining securities into another collateralized debt obligation
– creating a collateralized debt obligation squared. The cash flow
assumptions are identical to that of a regular collateralized debt obligation,
but now the assets that would have been a BB-, or lower, create a
collateralized debt obligation of a collateralized debt obligation, an
extremely risky practice.
A third component of the financial crisis was the emergence of a credit
default swap. A credit default swap is designed to transfer credit exposure
of fixed income products between two or more parties (Investopedia
2017a). For example, Bank of America issues collateralized debt
obligations, mortgages, or personal loans to generate revenue for its
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operations. Depending on the level of risk within those assets, Bank of
America may be willing to purchase an insurance package allowing it to
collect the principal and interest payments even if borrowers were to
default on their debt.
These investment instruments typically occur over-the-counter,
meaning that there is no active market such as the New York Stock
Exchange to determine the value. Therefore, it is largely up to the
individual commercial or investment bank to determine the value of such
securities and the appropriate risk and return factors. Such transactions are
typically held-to-maturity investments meaning that the investors expect
to generate a return for the duration of the mortgage. However, as
mortgages and other subprime fixed income products began to default, the
market turned to fair value accounting to determine the value of these
investments.
Both public and private entities funneled mortgages into the market,
allowing financial innovations to prosper. Government-sponsored entities,
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) quasirepresented the United States Government in the mortgage market. The
purpose of these two agencies is to provide stability in the secondary
market for residential mortgages, respond appropriately to capital markets
and provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market for residential
mortgages (Federal Housing Finance Agency 2017). A key characteristic,
exemplified by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s strategic objectives, was
to influence the secondary market for securitized mortgages. While they
were not under direct control of the government, Congress enacted
legislation expanding subprime lending such as the Community
Reinvestment Act as well as increased affordable housing goals for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, all of which correlated with the housing bubble.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board, overseen by the Securities
and Exchange Committee, develops and implements the generally
accepted accounting principles which all companies in the United States
must follow. This paper will focus on fair value accounting. Fair value
accounting requires companies to report assets and liabilities at the price
at which they would be sold or bought in an active market, thus writing up
or down assets and liabilities in terms of market conditions. One argument
against fair value market accounting is the excessive write-up of assets
during economic booms, and subsequently, excessive write-offs during
economic slowdowns.
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Leverage is borrowed capital used to increase potential investment or
working capital (Investopedia 2017b). For instance, if a financial
institution has $1 million in equity it has issued one million dollars’ worth
of the company’s shares to outside investors. It can increase the amount of
its capital by obtaining a long-term note or loan from another bank,
bringing its total assets and liabilities to two million. During economic
booms, firms use leverage to finance operations, invest, or increase its
cash on hand with the idea of generating a higher rate of return than
interest expense. Leverage can increase profits when the investment is
performing well, but when the investment flops it will destroy shareholder
value and increases write-offs (Investopedia 2017b).

II. Blowing Up the Bubble
A. MORTGAGES
Mortgages, specifically subprime mortgages, built the foundation of
the largest housing bubble in history. When determining the quality of a
mortgage, professionals analyze credit scores, loan-to-value ratio, and
debt-to-income ratios to determine if a mortgage is prime or subprime
(Wallison 2016, 724). Credit scores measure an individual’s ability to
meet their financial responsibilities in terms of credit card transactions,
rent obligations, or even a utility payment. Loan-to-value ratio is the size
of the loan relative to the value of the home. A larger down payment
reduces this ratio. Finally, underwriting professionals use the debt-toincome ratio, defined as the portion of a homebuyers’ income consumed
by debts (Wallison 2016, 725). A study conducted by Fannie Mae in 1992
determined that loans with delinquency rates of less than one percent were
considered a prime mortgage. Fannie Mae conducted the study on 26,000
random loans and found that 94% of these loans had at least a 10% down
payment, 85% had a debt to income ratio less than 38%, and only 2% had
more than one late payment (Wallison 2016, 719). The study gave an
insight as to how mortgages, particularly prime mortgages, were
characterized before underwriting standards deteriorated.
Subprime mortgages are often associated with late payments, minimal
or zero down payment at origin, and a debt to income ratio well above
38% (Wallison 2016, 788). The Federal Reserve conducted a study on
characteristics of loans originated during 1993 and determined the
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following: loan to value mortgages greater than 81% were more than three
times as likely to default or become delinquent. Also, households with
median FICO scores (621-660) or less, were 15 and 47 times greater of
becoming delinquent or defaulting (Avery and Brevoort 2015, Table 6).
This shows that not only are loan-to-value ratios a factor in determining
the quality of mortgage, but also that FICO scores are predictive in
determining whether a borrower will default. Another interesting statistic
the study found was that borrowers with more than 120% of area median
income, as well as high FICO scores, were only 1.1 times more likely to
default than those with prime mortgage characteristics, while borrowers
with income 80% to 120% of median income or below were 10.3 and 33.9
times more likely (Avery and Brevoort 1996, Table 6). The mortgage
meltdown can be attributed to underwriting professionals lending to
borrowers who were likely to default.
B. GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION AND ENTITIES
The Community Reinvestment Act was enacted to “establish an
affirmative obligation on the part of depository institutions to meet the
credit needs of their communities, including lower income borrowers”
(Avery and Brevoort 2014, 352). A misconception of the Community
Reinvestment Act is that banks must meet strict quotas of loans to low-tomoderate income borrowers within its deposit area. Banks are examined
and granted credits or points on their ability to invest in special purpose
development entities which facilitate investment in low to moderate
income communities (Getter 2015, 3). Such a system simply shows
investigators and congress the overall effectiveness of a bank’s operations
in serving low-to-moderate income borrowers. The reporting and
assignment of these credits or points is granted by passing a lending,
investing, and service test. Under the investment test, banks can purchase
secondary mortgages originated for public welfare investment such as
housing services or jobs. Further, banks are granted credit for promoting
community development projects such as affordable housing and financing
to small business in low-to-moderate income areas (Getter 2015, 6). By
allowing banks to earn such credits through secondary markets, the
Community Reinvestment Act encouraged depositories to lend to low-tomoderate income neighborhoods with little repercussion to the originators’
books. In all, Community Reinvestment Act depositories accounted for
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nearly $4.5 trillion in commitments in 2007 alone, with $1.6 trillion
allocated toward single family mortgages (Pinto 2011, 22).
Apart from its internal objectives, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
under considerable pressure to fulfill initiatives established by Congress
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Such objectives
include the National Homeownership Strategy, affordable housing goals,
and the Fair Lending Best Practices Initiative. The Fair Lending Best
Practices Initiative, designed by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, was a major stepping stone in the formation of Fannie
Mae’s partnership with the private sector. In a 2001 newsletter, the
department said “since 1994, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development has made agreements with lenders across the nation that are
individually tailored to public-private partnerships that are considered on
the leading edge. The Agreements offer an opportunity to increase lowincome and minority lending incorporating equal opportunity principles
into mortgage standards” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development 2001). The Best Practices initiative signed on 117
companies, one of which, Countrywide, made over $789 billion worth of
loans towards the program (Wallison 2016, 2480). The Best Practices
initiative was one of the first times the Department of Housing and Urban
Development intervened with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It would not
be the last as the department raised low to moderate income housing goals
yearly from 40% in 1996 to 56% in 2008 – the first-year Fannie and
Freddie did not surpass such goals (Federal Housing Financing Agency
2010, 22). Essentially, what this means is that the Department of Housing
and Urban Development was gradually increasing the share of loans to
low-to-moderate income borrowers, which was extremely risky. As Fannie
and Freddie were constantly feeling pressure from HUD, they became
increasingly exposed to the subprime mortgage market. This continued
until they could not meet the 56% goal required by HUD.
The National Homeownership strategy was developed under the
Clinton Administration during 1996. It called for all-time high
homeownership rates within 6 years of its implementation (Wallison 2016,
2500). The initiative increased affordable housing goals to low-tomoderate income households from 30% to 40% in 1996, reduced downpayment requirements, cut transactions costs, and increased the
availability of alternative financing throughout the country (Wallison
2016, 2500). The most notable component of the National Homeownership
strategy was the reduction of down payment requirements. Private
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mortgage companies issued mortgages with as little as a 5% down
payment, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac developed products that only
require 3%, and the Veterans’ Administration guaranteed no-down
payment mortgages for qualified households (U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development 1996).
During the last quarter of the 20th century, the United States
Government made it extremely clear that owning a home was an essential
part of the American Dream, illustrated by the vast numbers of mortgages
on the books of various government agencies. As of June 30, 2008, the
United States Government had nearly 24 million mortgages on its books,
$1.4 trillion and $1.1 trillion in outstanding balances for Fannie and
Freddie, $537 billion for the Federal Housing Association and Veteran
Affairs, and $312 billion related to the Community Reinvestment Act
(Pinto 2011, 30). In addition, it encouraged home ownership through the
mortgage interest tax deduction, worth 420 billion in 2009 alone (Stansel
and Randazzo 2011, 1).
C. WALL STREET’S ROLE
Wall Street’s significant role in the financial crisis is engraved into
many Americans’ minds. Financial innovations such as collateralized debt
obligations and credit default swaps added to housing bubble of the late
1990s and early 2000s. During the financial crisis, investment banks
focused on the securitization of mortgage backed securities, meaning they
targeted subprime mortgages entering the market due to the reduction of
underwriting standards, affordable housing polices, and initiatives for lowto-moderate income borrowers allowed higher interest rates –leading to
higher yields. The secondary market typically handled securitized
transactions consisting of refinancing or debt consolidations. The
secondary market saw exceptional growth from 2002 to 2006 in terms of
securitized mortgages entering the market, rising from 9% in 2001 to 40%
in 2006 (Park 2009, 127). Investment firms such as Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and others were increasingly aware of the
profitability of subprime mortgages, so long as default and delinquency
rates stayed low. The Cordell paper, an analysis of collateralized debt
obligation markets between 1999-2007, concluded that 727 pools of
collateralized debt were issued totaling $641 billion, of which $241 billion
consisted of CDO2s (Wallison 2016, 1967). Comparatively, mortgage
backed securities had an estimated market value of roughly $5.8 trillion
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during that same timespan, with $299 billion collateralized with ratings of
BBB or less (Wallison 1967, 2016). This confirms that Wall Street
investment firms had high demand for mortgaged back securities because
of their profitability and the ability to put them into collateralized debt
obligations, essentially profiting twice off the same asset.
In practice, credit default swaps are a form of insurance on underlying
assets with the potential to default. Credit default swaps were very
profitable as the housing market continued to grow. Once those underlying
securities began to default, it was clear that credit default swaps would be
an extreme burden on those who provided the insurance, such as American
Insurance Group (AIG) and Bear Stearns. When such loans defaulted,
Wall Street’s irresponsibility became clear.
Mortgage backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and credit
default swaps were sound in theory if used responsibly. But as the
proportion of subprime loans increased, they were sound only if housing
prices kept rising. Once the housing market peaked and subsequently
deflated, it was evident that the speculation surrounding the underlying
assets had failed to properly evaluate the risk.
D. DEFLATION
The Case-Shiller index measures national housing prices from small towns
to large metropolitan areas. The base year index is 2000, when it equaled
100. Housing prices peaked in 2006 at 184.62 (Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis 2017). The increase in price can be explained by the vast number
of consumers willing and able to buy a home due to the reduction of
underwriting standards and affordable housing goals. As underwriting
standards deteriorated, borrowers could borrow more and more, raising
demand and so increasing the price of a home by nearly 85% over a sixyear period. Once the housing market began to collapse in early 2007,
borrowers with subprime characteristics were unable to make mortgage
payments and were unable to refinance their mortgage because the value
of their asset had decreased. For the most part, it was a result of variable
interest rates that coaxed borrowers in while interest rates were low, but
as the federal reserve raised interest rates, borrowers were unable to afford
their payments.
As default and delinquency rates began to increase, investment firms
and commercial banks began to see mortgage-backed securities’ cash
flows decline. This led to a decline in the value of the securities; thus,
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banks began to write down mortgage backed assets, capital levels began
to fall, and ultimately banks began to fail. The combination of these things
led to a liquidly crunch, putting credit markets and the national economy
into shambles. market participants strained to evaluate investments which
significantly declined almost overnight.

III.

Fair Value Accounting

A. FINANCIAL STANDARD 157
Prior to the issuance of Financial Accounting Standard 157, fair market
value accounting was loosely defined with little guidance from accounting
pronouncements on how to value an asset or liability. In 2006, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Financial Accounting
Standard 157, setting the groundwork for modern fair value accounting.
The standard defines fair value as “the price that would be received to sell
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between
market participants at the measurement date”(Financial Accounting
Standard Board 2006, 8). Fair value is the price that would be received to
sell the asset, not the price originally paid. An example will clarify the
rationale: BCD, Inc is willing to sell mortgage backed securities initially
acquired for $100 for $50, their current market value. The underlying
reason for the write-down of the asset would be attributed to factors such
as increased default and delinquency rates, leading BCD’s management to
believe that only $50 will be collected on the securitized mortgages. The
fair value would not be the initial $100 because market conditions
deteriorated and caused the value of the asset to decrease. Financial
Accounting Standard 157 established three levels at which fair value
measurement can be attained. Level 1, the most observable and reliable
valuation method, is a quoted price in an active market for identical assets
or liabilities that the reporting entity can access at the measurement date
(Financial Accounting Standard Board 2006, 12). Quoted prices can be
obtained from the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, Standard and
Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) and other sources. This is the most accurate and
unbiased level of evaluation under Financial Accounting Standard 157 as
the markets in which information is gathered are extremely active and
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transparent. Because of the accuracy and reliability quoted prices attain,
when such prices are available, they are required for the measurement of
the asset or liability.
The second level of the fair value hierarchy is defined as market to
model, which means some market inputs are available, but not enough to
determine the fair value. This requires some judgement. Level 2 inputs are
observable inputs for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly and
include interest rates, yield curves, credit risks, default rates, and others
derived principally from or corroborated by observable data (Financial
Accounting Standard Board 2006, 12). As mentioned, level 2 inputs are
not directly quoted from an active market, requiring firms to use their own
judgement when determining the fair value of an asset. The standard
requires that firms include risk and nonperformance risk. It states “a fair
value measurement includes an adjustment for risk if market participants
would include one in pricing the related asset or liability, even if the
adjustment is difficult to determine “(Financial Accounting Standard
Board 2006, 12). An example of a failure to do so would be collateralized
debt obligations issued by commercial and investment banks. By assuming
the housing market would continue to rise, the issuers of such securities
failed to assess the risk of delinquent and default mortgages issued to
subprime borrowers, and thus acquired securities that were extremely
overvalued once the housing bubble began to deflate. Nonperformance risk
affects liabilities’ fair measurement as a company’s credit rating improves
or decreases. As a firm’s credit rating increases, it is more likely that it can
repay debt and other liabilities with ease; as it decreases, the opposite is
true. During the liquidity crunch, commercial banks and others faced
extreme pressure as write-offs decreased the bottom-line leading to the
decreased probability they could repay debt.
Level 3 inputs measure the fair value using unobservable inputs, in
markets that are non-existent or with few transactions. The standard says,
“unobservable inputs shall be used to measure fair value to the extent that
relevant observable inputs are not available, thereby allowing for
situations in which there is little, if any, market activity for the asset or
liability at the measurement date (Financial Accounting Standard Board
2006, 15).” Because there is little, if any, available information in such a
market, it is completely up to the discretion of the company to value the
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asset or liability. When determining the fair value measurement,
observable inputs should be developed with “the best information
available under the circumstance” and the reporting entity should “not
ignore information about market participant assumptions that are
reasonably available without undue costs and effort” (Financial
Accounting Standard Board 157, 15). As the housing market was
deflating, financial intuitions were confused as to how to value financial
securities backed by mortgages. Thus, write-downs became frequent and
the market for mortgage backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations ceased to exist as market participants were afraid to purchase
deflated securities.
The final component of Financial Accounting Standard 157 relates to
the disclosure of fair value measurement computations. The standard says,
“assets and liabilities measured at fair value on a recurring basis in periods
after initial recognition, the reporting entity shall disclose information that
enables users of its financial statements to assess inputs for the
development of those measurements” (Financial Accounting Standard
Board 157, 16). To adequately fulfill that objective, reporting entities must
disclose the fair value measurements at the reporting date including the
level of inputs and report all level three inputs with a reconciliation of the
beginning and ending balances. Also, reporting entities must show a
calculation of total gains and losses as well as any purchases, sales,
issuances and transfers from or to level 3. Finally, the reporting entity
must show the valuation technique used to measure the fair value with a
description of changes in related inputs during the period (Financial
Accounting Standard Board 2006, 16).
A study conducted by Christian Laux and Christian Leuz on
measurement inputs among major investment firms (Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch) as well as major banks (JP Morgan,
Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo) shows how assets were
measured during the first quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2009.The
study concluded that between the first quarter of 2007 and the first quarter
of 2009, an average of 23.71% of major investment bank assets were
measured using level one inputs. Level 1 inputs were relatively stable
between 25-27% during 2007, but in 2008 the inputs dropped from 23.3%
during the first quarter, to 15.5% at the end of the 2008 fiscal year (Laux
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and Leuz 2010, 112). During that same fiscal year, level 2 inputs increased
from 65.9% to a peak of 70.9% well above its average of 65.86% through
the two-year period (Laux and Leuz 2010, 112). Level 3 inputs saw the
most exceptional growth in this portion of the study. Major investment
banks used such inputs to measure its assets only 7% of the time in 2007.
In the last quarter of 2008, however, that number more than doubled to
14.3% (Laux and Leuz 2010, 112).
A similar story is found within major bank companies. Major bank
companies used level one inputs at a rate of 33.5% during the first quarter
of 2007, but that number steadily decreased after the second quarter of
2007. Beginning during the second quarter of 2007, level one inputs for
major bank holding companies steadily decreased every quarter from
36.4% (Q2 2007) to 19.3% by the end of first quarter of 2009. Level two
and three inputs both increased as level one inputs declined rapidly
throughout the period 2007-2009. Level two inputs remained relatively
stable throughout the 2007 and the third quarter of 2008 ranging from 60.2
to 57.7% (Laux and Leuz 2010, 112). During the fourth quarter of 2008
level two inputs jumped considerably from 57.7% to 68.2%, a 10.5-point
increase. Level three inputs accounted for 9.2% of measurement inputs in
2007; by the third quarter of 2008, that number increased to 14.6% (Laux
and Leuz 2010, 112).
As the study shows, major commercial banks and Wall Street
investment firms lacked direct market prices of their assets throughout the
financial crisis. The lack of quoted prices made fair value measurement
rely on the discretion of the financial institution reporting the asset or
liability. The use of observable inputs such as interest rates, yield curves,
default rates as well as lack of transactions concerning over-the-counter
collateralized debt obligations, mortgage backed securities, and credit
default swaps frustrated firms as write-offs and realized losses were
abundant on income statements.
B. ADVOCATES FOR FAIR VALUE
The Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Financial Accounting
Standard 157 to improve the transparency of financial markets, allowing
investors and creditor’s alike to make informed decisions. Advocates for
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Financial Accounting Standard 157 believe it improves the usefulness of
accounting information, removes inconsistencies, and unifies fair value
measurement and disclosure requirements (Bikki et al 2010, 488). Fair
value accounting improves the usefulness of accounting information by
reporting and disclosing the price at which an asset or liability can be sold,
using input levels already described (Bikki et al 2010, 448). In terms of
market volatility and reliability, the financial fraud of the early 2000s (e.g
Enron and WorldCom) shows how misinterpreted assets harmed capital
markets. Proponents argue that Financial Accounting Standard 157
eliminates the inconsistencies of fair value measures. This is true, as the
standard sets forth the rules for measuring assets and liabilities with either
level one, two, or three inputs. Further, the standard applies to all reporting
entities. Before its implementation, fair value was different for every
sector of an industry. For example, a bank would measure fair value
differently than a mutual fund, while both have similar assets and
liabilities. By removing all the inconsistences in fair value measurement,
the standard logically brings uniformity to both how to measure and
disclose assets and liabilities. Supporters of the standard believe all firms
must use similar methods when determining the value of an asset as it will
provide transparency for market participants, leading to improved decision
making.
C. CRITICS OF FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING
The volatility that followed the bursting of the housing bubble is at the
forefront of the criticism of fair value accounting. Banking professionals
believe that such rules caused excessive bank write-offs by affecting
management decisions. The criticism regarding the usefulness of fair value
accounting includes a contagion effect on financial markets, reliability of
methods to estimate fair value, loss on other-than temporary investments,
and leverage and volatility (Bikki et al 2010, 484). The contagion effect
can be explained through basic economic principles of supply and demand.
As the default rate of underlying assets of collateralized debt obligations
and mortgage backed securities increased, the cash flows and thus the
entire investment lost substantial value – deceasing the demand and price.
Because mortgaged backed securities and collateralized debt obligations
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were over the counter, there was not an active market for these
investments, so financial firms increased the amount of level two and three
inputs. Once a firm wrote down the price of the investment, it was clear
other participants would have to do it too, creating a domino effect for
holders of subprime mortgage backed securities’ and collateralized debt
obligations.
Critics of fair value market accounting argue that one of the main
weaknesses lies in the valuation methods require under the standard.
Critics argue that the standard requires reporting entities to write assets
down to market levels even when they intend to hold them to maturity,
unjustly decreasing their value in times of economic hardship. In addition,
critics argue that because market write offs decreased the demand and
price, transactions were infrequent and the price may not be representative
of the underlying long-term value of the asset (Bikki et al 2010, 485).
Opponents of fair value accounting also argue that market values suffer
from inherent risk of volatility. They believe that mark to market results
in artificial volatility in income because deviation from the cost of longterm assets such as collateralized debt obligations and mortgaged backed
securities will occur throughout the term of the assets. For example, a
mortgaged backed security during the financial crisis saw a substantial
decrease in value as default and delinquency rates rose. In hindsight, the
housing market recovered in years after the bubble burst, which would
have allowed mortgaged backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations to begin to recover as well. Critics were concerned, and rightly
so, that because such economic hardship had occurred because of the
housing bubble, that the market overreacted, causing a liquidity crunch as
investment and commercial banks write-offs increased. Finally, critics of
fair value accounting argue that fair value accounting increases leverage
during booms, creating vulnerability in the financial system. However,
during economic hardship, it is hard to repay a debt because of the
deflated prices in financial market – increasing the risk of insolvency and
a liquidity crunch throughout the entire financial system.
D. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARD 157-4
During the peak of the financial crisis, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board observed market participants’ complaints surrounding the
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methods of valuation required by Financial Accounting Standard 157 by
issuing a staff position. The staff position emphasizes that even if there has
been a significant decrease in the volume and level of activity for the asset
or liability, regardless of the valuation technique used, the object of fair
value measurement remains the same as in Financial Accounting Standard
157 – meaning fair value is the price that would be received to sell an asset
or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction (Financial
Accounting Standard Board 2009, 5). As mentioned, one of the major
concerns surrounding the opponents of Financial Accounting Standard 157
was the quoted prices in a market that is not active, therefore not
qualifying as an orderly transaction. The staff position provided guidance
on determining when there is a significant decrease in the volume and
level of activity. The staff position states a reporting entity should evaluate
specific factors to determine whether there has been a significant decrease
in the volume and level of activity for the asset or liability compared to
normal market conditions. The factors include: few recent transactions,
price quotations not based on current information, price quotations vary
substantially over time or among market makers, indexes highly correlated
with fair values of the asset are demonstrably uncorrelated with recent
indications of fair value, significant increase in implied liquidity risk
premium, yields, and finally, there is a significant decline or objective of
market issuances for the asset or liability (Financial Accounting Standard
Board 2009, 5). If the reporting entity concludes there has been a
significant decrease in the level of activity for the asset or liability in
relation to normal market activity, transactions may not be determinative
of fair value – therefore requiring further analysis of the transactions of
quoted prices needed in accordance with Financial Accounting Standard
157 (Financial Accounting Standard Board 2009, 6).
The issuance of the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s staff
position is clearly aimed towards enhancing the clarity within the level two
and three inputs, especially level three inputs. The response of the
Financial Accounting Standard Board shows that such inputs within the
fair value hierarchy were in fact causing havoc in financial institutions
throughout the financial crisis – begging the question if in fact the
interpretation of Financial Accounting 157 further harmed capital markets
prolonging the financial recession of 2007-2009.

92

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2017

IV. Analysis
As shown thus far, the financial recession was correlated with housing
policies, underwriting standards and Wall Street’s appetite for high
yielding securities. In an analysis of Financial Accounting Standard 157’s
relevance in the 2007-2009 recession, the first question that must be
answered is whether fair value market accounting is justified in financial
markets. The answer, based on my interpretation of financial markets
throughout the time, is yes. First, if mark-to-market accounting was not
enforced and regulated, fraudulent activities would steadily increase,
reducing investor confidence. This would discourage investment in the
United States, causing an economic slowdown. Second, if United States
capital markets were not transparent, business would be reluctant to lend
to each other, harming not only national corporations, but also to local
businesses. Third, if the United States did not implement some form of fair
value accounting, inconsistencies between national firms would vary so
much that investors and decision makers would be misinformed --- leading
to bad decisions and write-offs. Imagine if during the financial crisis
investment banks such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns were not
required to implement some form of market component to their financial
statements. If this were the case, both could still be operating today -finding new subprime borrowers to issue subprime mortgage backed
securities, while investors were provided with healthy financial statements
when in fact they were materially misstated; such a result could have
destroyed the entire financial industry. Inconsistent financial statements
and the potential for foreign investment to flee the country provides
support for fair value accounting’s relevance to the United States.
The second question that arises is simply: is there another way to
define fair value? Financial Accounting Standard 157 defines fair value as
“the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer an
asset or liability in an orderly transaction between market participants.”
The Financial Accounting Standards Board staff position further gives
firms the ability to determine whether the market is producing orderly
transactions justifying depressed price levels as the true financial position
of the asset. I believe this is the best way to define fair value as if it were
defined another way, it would not truly be the fair value of the asset or
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liability at stake. By this, I mean, transactions cannot be labeled “projected
discounted cash flow value” giving premium price to an asset or liability
above or below its true fair value. For example, if an asset was going to
produce $75 worth of return, the company purchasing the asset would not
purchase it for $75 as it would not make financial sense. However, if the
firm selling the asset believes the asset is only going to be worth $55, and
it purchased it for $50 it would make logical sense for both firms to find
common ground. This is how markets work. The willingness of sellers to
accept a price and the willingness of buyers to offer a price establishes an
equilibrium and true fair value.
Does the hierarchy provided in Financial Accounting Standard 157
provide the best method for such reporting? Level one inputs (from active
markets) are extremely relevant in determining the true market value of
securities and other assets. Level two inputs include observable and
unobservable inputs, meaning that there is somewhat of an active market,
but not enough information to justify the valuation using only those inputs.
Further, financial reporting entities should include an analysis of
performance and nonperformance risk within the respective asset or
liabilities. This is where the ignorance of commercial and investment
banks during the financial crisis got them into trouble, causing them to
believe that fair value accounting itself was the cause of extreme writeoffs. Allowing unobservable inputs to justify the valuation of an asset or
liability pool in the hundreds of millions of dollars does not make logical
sense to me. Financial institutions could look at interest rates, delinquency
rates, and general economic activity that pointed towards the mortgaged
backed securities and collateralized debt obligations becoming worthless
during the financial crisis – leading to extreme write-offs and ensuing
credit crunch. Once economic hardship began to decrease and consumers
were spending more and housing prices rebounded, those assets regained
their value-begging the question of why such excessive write-offs
occurred.
Financial institutions cannot blame the standard itself as most of them
knew and understood the increased risk of subprime mortgages and
packaging them into mortgaged backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations. They simply failed to recognize the performance risk
associated with level two inputs. Level three inputs involve unobservable
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inputs with little or no market activity, giving the reporting entity
essentially freedom as to what and how the valuation of liabilities and
assets are derived. Again, this does not make much sense to me as
financial firms would be allowed to use their own models and inputs to
determine the value of assets and liabilities. As mentioned, such inputs are
usually interpreted from inactive and non-existence markets such as the
market for collateralized debt obligations. As market participants realized
that the underlying assets in their investments (CDOs) were worthless,
they tried to unload them as fast as possible – taking any price they would
receive. However, once it was evident that the housing bubble did indeed
burst, it was impossible to unload such assets, further depressing the price
as one firm followed another. Unobservable inputs in a nonexistent or
nonactive market should not be allowed in the short term when
determining the value of long-term assets or liabilities. There is a reason
that such a market has dried up or does not exist – because such assets and
liabilities are essentially worthless in current market conditions.
It is clear, with the issuance of staff position 157-4, that the fair value
hierarchy established by Financial Accounting Standard 157 had some
flaws, as I have argued, specifically within the level two and three levels
of the hierarchy. Overall, the analysis shows reporting entities should not
be allowed to use unobservable inputs and should be very limited on the
indirect inputs allowed through the level two. One general fix to this
problem is to eliminate level three entirely, while compiling a list of
standardized indirect inputs varying from industry to industry to determine
the fair value of assets and liabilities. This would allow the inputs to
remain consistent throughout industries, while eliminating unobservable
inputs that are largely up to the discretion of the reporting entity.
The purpose of this paper was to answer the question: Was the
implementation of Financial Standard 157 the sole reason US capital
markets deteriorated during the 2008 recession? The answer is no.
Although it did affect the market correction following the burst of the
housing bubble, my analysis shows that it did not in-of-itself deteriorate
US capital markets; it simply corrected errors in judgement of the United
States Government, Wall Street, and underwriting professionals.
First, the housing bubble was ballooning well before Financial
Accounting Standard 157, as subprime mortgages were entering the market
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because of reduced underwriting standards. FICO scores, loan-to-value
ratios, and debt-to-income ratios are extremely relevant in determining the
performance of a loan. Underwriting professionals did not follow duediligence as they were aware of the risks associated with subprime lending,
but everyone was becoming wealthy so they did not care. The flaw in such
lending is obvious – everyone does not have a right to own a home if they
are not financially capable of doing so. The fact that local banks continued
to issue subprime mortgages knowing the implications of subprime lending
proves their ignorance. The failure of mortgages throughout the financial
crisis was due to a fundamental flaw in contemporary underwriting
standards and nothing else.
Second, United States housing policies encouraged underwriting
professionals to lend to various subprime borrowers who were unable to
pay their mortgages. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
was constantly putting pressure on government sponsored entities such as
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac who searched for, and found, subprime
mortgages from banks to fulfill strict requirements such as the low-tomoderate income housing goals. Such goals increased by nearly 2%
increments per year after starting in 1996 all the way to 2008. Further, the
Community Reinvestment Act and Best Practices initiative opened the
flood gates for low-to-moderate income borrowers to received mortgages
with high loan-to-value ratios paired with poor FICO scores and high debtto income ratios, which is a recipe for disaster.
Third, investment and commercial banks constantly bought subprime
mortgages and securitized them into mortgaged backed securities and
collateralized debt obligations. Investment banks who packaged such
securities undoubtedly knew the risk associated with subprime positions.
Once the housing bubble deflated, their aggressive search for short-term
yield on long-term investments was exposed. As a result, a liquidity crunch
ensued, discouraging banks and other financial institutions from lending
to one another, causing firms such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns
to close operations. As mentioned, the securities backed by subprime
mortgages were intended to be held-to-maturity investments and accounted
for as such. Yet financial institutions were constantly trading them during
the active bubble while profits were increasing and investors were happy
– leading to the common investment mistake of “it will last forever.” Wall
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Street got caught in the moment and continued to issue subprime
mortgages simply because they did not believe the bubble would burst (or
at least while they held the asset). So while the fundamental cause was
local and regional lenders issuing and subsequently selling off mortgages
to investment firms, Wall Street facilitated and magnified the mistake.
Finally, the implementation of Financial Accounting Standard 157
cannot be blamed for the ultimate collapse of US capital markets because
it was implemented well after the largest subprime housing bubble
ballooned housing prices. It was implemented during the 2006 fiscal year,
the year housing prices peaked. When the standard was issued, the
Financial Accounting Standard Board believed the market to be healthy,
which in hindsight was false. But because of the timing, the
implementation of Financial Accounting Standard 157 was blamed for
disastrous housing polices and fundamentally flawed underwriting
practices. The combination of lax underwriting standards paired with Wall
Street’s increased appetite for high yields added fuel to an already flaming
housing market. Further, the continued pressure from national housing
polices and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for lowto-moderate income lending pushed the market to the brink. Therefore, the
standard is not the sole reason that US capital markets collapsed causing
the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression; it was simply
another element to an already complex and fundamentally flawed
economic circumstance.

V. Conclusion
The most recent economic recession, called the Great Recession, was the
most severe economic decline seen around the world since the Great
Depression. The recession was due to the deflation of the housing bubble,
brought about by lax underwriting standards, government low-to-moderate
income housing goals, and Wall Street financial innovations. Some believe
the implementation of fair value accounting, specifically Financial
Accounting Standard 157 is the sole reason why the recession and liquidity
crunch occurred. While the timing and initial implementation of the
standard caused excessive write-offs, it is not the sole reason as to why the
market corrected – it was simply the correcting agent needed for a more
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transparent and accurate depiction of macroeconomic conditions. That
alone justifies the Standard’s relevance during the financial recession and
for years to come.
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